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Abstract
We study the impact of organized crime on electoral results analyzing
in detail the national parliamentary elections in Sicily for the period 1946-
92. We document the significant support given by the Sicilian mafia to the
Christian Democratic Party when the electoral competition by the Commu-
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Politics and mafia are both powers which draw life from the control of the
same territory; so they either wage war or come to some form of agreement.
Paolo Borsellino1
1 Introduction
Organized crime is detrimental to the functioning of a society. Its negative impact on
growth and economic activity has been established in several recent studies (Dixit, 2004;
Daniele and Marani, 2011; Pinotti, 2015). The negative impact of organized crime is,
however, not confined to the economy. One of the main features of mafias around the
world is their relationship with the political power. The strong control of the territory
achieved through the use of violence also challenges the functioning of democratic polit-
ical institutions. For instance, criminal organizations can directly influence policymakers
with bribes and violent threats so as to obtain policies favorable to their business or looser
judicial prosecution. This was the case in Colombia during the period of the Medellin
cartel and it is arguably occurring currently in Mexico and Brazil (Dal Bó, Dal Bó and Di
Tella, 2006). The relationship between mafia and democracy is paradoxical because on
one side its presence weakens the democratic institutions but on the other side it exploits
democratic freedoms to strengthen its presence and weave a web of relationships with the
political power (Allum and Siebert, 2003). The development of the mafia in transition
economies exemplifies this nexus: organized crime exploits the gaps opened up by the
lift of totalitarian control on political institutions, as well as the inability of the transition
countries to put in place strong institutions and rule of law (Varese, 2001).
This paper addresses a far-reaching impact of organized crime: its intrusion into the
electoral process, the heart of democratic institutions. There are several reasons to believe
1Judge Paolo Borsellino was on the front line in the fight against the mafia in the 1980s. He
was killed in a car bomb attack in Palermo on 19 July 1992, a few months after his colleague Judge
G. Falcone. This quotation is taken from Abbate and Gomez (2007, p.36).
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that a criminal organization, with a network of members who have infiltrated the social
and economic fabric of the territory, and using violence to affirm their power, may shift
votes to the party it supports. In his seminal work on the Italian mafia, Gambetta (1993)
points out how criminal organizations find themselves in an ideal position to sell their
services to politicians. Indeed, their tight hold over the territory enables an effective
control of many votes. The market for votes, with its problems of verification and trust on
both the buyer and the seller side, is an ideal setting for mafia operations. In the words of
Abadinsky (2012, p.116), “the Mafia is able to control votes because in the environment
in which it operates there is always fear of reprisals. Intimidations, surveillance of polling
places, and sometimes rigged elections guarantee an outcome favorable to the Mafia”.
Beyond the rhetoric adopted by politicians, when elections approach there is a strong
incentive for parties to negotiate with criminal organizations to secure their electoral sup-
port. A conversation between the President of the Parliamentary Committee on the Mafia
and the former mafioso Leonardo Messina well exemplifies the behavior of politicians
with respect to organized crime (CPM, 1992b, p.552):
Mr. Messina. Usually, in public speeches, every politician claims to be
against the mafia; you need to see what he actually does and the part he
has to play. In Sicily, anyone who gets on the stage in an electoral rally is
against the mafia.
President. Is this something that worries you?
Mr. Messina. No, it doesn’t. The whole thing is a farce!
It is worth stressing the difference between the electoral role of organized crime and
the one played by other interest groups (e.g., trade unions, lobbies, churches). As ex-
plained by Gambetta (1993) violence is the crucial resource used by organized crime to
guarantee protection and contract enforcement. And the illegal market for votes provides
a clear opportunity for its services. Consistent evidence shows that criminal organizations
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use violence to establish their control of the territory and develop their political influence,
following a logic of building their reputation and credibility in a repeated game setting.
For example, the Sicilian mafia is responsible for the killing of 353 individuals (not related
to mafia organizations) in the period between the end of WWII and 1992 with a peak of
175 killings in 1980s. Among those murdered, 56 were politicians, trade unionist or jour-
nalists.2 A recent parliamentary commission, investigating the killing of local politicians
from the 1970s, reports that in the period from 1974 to 2013 35 local politicians were
murdered in Sicily, first among Italian regions in this inglorious ranking.3 Alesina, Pic-
colo and Pinotti (2016) further stress the crucial role of violence in the electoral services
of organized crime by showing a significant increase in homicide rates in Italy during the
12 months before the elections, with the effect being particularly strong in Sicily for the
murder of politicians.
The regular use of violence clearly differentiates organized crime from other inter-
est groups like churches, trade unions and lobbies. A church can induce its believers
to voluntarily vote for its preferred party, but has little influence on those outside their
communities. Similarly, trade unions can command an influence on the votes voluntarily
cast by their members, but have little influence on non-members. The implicit or explicit
threat of violent retaliation instead gives criminal organizations the ability to also influ-
ence the voting behavior of non-mafia members, and to induce part of the electorate to
vote against their genuine preference. This, in turn, makes their intrusion in the electoral
process exceptionally damaging for a democracy, and therefore worth studying.
There is a large body of anecdotal evidence, court cases, political investigations and
press inquiries about the alleged existence of such underground electoral deals. The ex-
2Several NGOs provide web-based sources about innocent victims of criminal organizations
in Italy. Our figures are reported in www.vittimedimafia.it. See also www.progettolegalita.it for
additional information about mafia victims.
3The vast majority of these murders were perpetrated during the period considered in this study.
The commission was established by the Italian Senate in 2013 and submitting its final report in
February 2015 (CPIAL, 2015).
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isting material, however, falls short of empirical investigation.
This leads to the contribution of the present work. This is the first study which exam-
ines the impact of organized crime on electoral outcomes. We use post-WWII (1946-92)
parliamentary elections in Sicily as a case, and document the support provided to the
Christian Democratic Party (DC) by one of the most notorious criminal organizations, the
Sicilian mafia.
To guide our empirical analysis we first develop a simple probabilistic model of policy
competition which includes a criminal organization that can sell votes to the supported
party. Adapting the theoretical framework developed by Acemoglu, Robinson and Santos
(2013) to the case of an electoral system with proportional representation and a single
national constituency, we analyze the equilibrium of a game in which parties competes
not only for voters but also for the support of the mafia which is present in one of the
regions in which the country is divided. We show that the incumbent wins the competition
for the mafia support and that the support from the mafia increases when the advantage
of the incumbent shrinks in the regions without mafia. The latter results constitute the
cornerstone of our empirical strategy. Notice that, in line with the above discussion on the
vote coercing ability of organized crime, we assume that the amount of votes delivered by
the mafia changes depending on the demand for votes and the equilibrium price paid by
the competing political parties.
The mechanism behind our identification strategy is relatively intuitive: the political
rent generated by mafia-controlled votes becomes more valuable to the incumbent party
when electoral competition strengthens. When the incumbent party loses ground with
respect to its direct competitors, the mafia is therefore expected to engage more deeply in
electoral matters.
Using the change in electoral competition in the rest of Italy as a source of exogenous
variation, we can then identify the impact of mafia on electoral outcomes. Our results
provide clear evidence of the mafia involvement in electoral services: when electoral
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competition increased, DC (the incumbent party) systematically captured more votes in
Sicilian municipalities in which the mafia was operating.
The magnitude of the impact is far from negligible: according to our most trustworthy
estimate, in which we instrument recent mafia presence with its 1900 distribution, the DC
gained on average about 13 additional percentage points in mafia-ridden Sicilian munic-
ipalities as a consequence of the strong increase in the competition by the second largest
party, the Communist Party (PCI), during the period studied.
What has the mafia gained from its electoral services? We provide evidence that, in
exchange for its support, the mafia received economic advantages for its activities in the
construction industry, a sector in which the influence of public authorities and politicians
is quite strong. When electoral competition strengthened, the share of construction work-
ers increased significantly more in mafia-ridden municipalities than in the rest of Sicily.
This paper speaks to two broad strands of research. First, we contribute to the lit-
erature on electoral fraud and vote coercion by shedding new light on a specific sort of
electoral fraud, relatively neglected so far: vote coercion by criminal organizations.4 Two
recent papers addressing vote coercion are close to ours in several aspects. First, Baland
and Robinson (2008), in their work on mid-XX century Chilean elections, show how land-
lords are able to influence electoral outcomes by inducing their tenants to vote for one par-
ticular party. The second paper, by Acemoglu, Robinson and Santos (2013), explores the
impact of the presence of non-state armed groups on electoral outcomes in Colombia for
the years 1991-2006: in areas with a strong paramilitary presence there was, after 2001,
a significant increase in the votes for candidates whose preferences were close to those of
the armed groups.5 With respect to the work of Acemoglu, Robinson and Santos (2013),
4Recent contributions to this literature test the importance of monitoring technologies that
enable vote buyers to control voters’ actions (Larreguy 2013, Larreguy, Montiel and Querubin
2014). For a review see Lehoucq (2003).
5See Fergusson, Vargas and Vela (2013), who also study the impact of paramilitaries on Colom-
bian elections and the unintended consequences of free press.
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we base our analysis on a much longer period including twelve elections, rely on a large
set of time-varying controls, and implement an instrumental variable strategy to address
the potential non-random distribution of the mafia. Another key difference between their
paper and ours is the nature of the organization coercing voters we consider. Colombian
paramilitary groups, the focus of Acemoglu, Robinson and Santos (2013), were formed
and sponsored by large landlords to counter the activities of the leftist guerrilla groups.
Hence, from their very origin they were organizations with a strong political connotation.
Accordingly, when they gained sufficient control of the territory, they influenced elections
to support their political preference lying on the extreme right of the local political spec-
trum. Organized crime, and the Sicilian mafia in particular, is a non-partisan organization
without any particular political agenda.6 Its involvement in electoral coercion is purely
driven by rent-seeking motives. Its control of the territory, resulting from weak local in-
stitutions and the regular use of violence, enable an extensive control of voters which can
be used to obtain any sort of favors from politicians.
Second, this work complements the recent literature on the economics of organized
crime. Beside the studies assessing the cost of organized crime mentioned above, the eco-
nomic literature has mainly investigated its origins. Dixit (2004) investigated the emer-
gence of extralegal arrangements and organizations in the absence of formal institutions
(or when they are weak) and when laws are difficult to enforce. The coordination prob-
6The report on the relationship between the Sicilian mafia and politics published by the Parlia-
mentary Committee on the mafia in 1993 (CPM, 1993) is very explicit on its ideological neutrality.
“There is a general consensus on the fact that Cosa Nostra influences elections. This does not de-
pend on an ideological stance, but by the aim to use in the best possible way their control of the
territory and their social connections” (CPM, 1993, p.64). “Cosa Nostra is not precluded to any
party. And no party can consider themselves immune to the mafia” (CPM 1993, p.65). In fact,
beyond the links with the Christian Democrats the Sicilian mafia allegedly developed links with
politicians in other parties, especially at local level. The most relevant example is the strong sup-
port that Cosa Nostra gave to the anti-DC coalition which governed the Sicilian regional council
between 1958 and 1961 with the Christian Democrats at the opposition (CPM, 1993, p.52-3). The
support provided in local elections to candidates coming from very different political background
is also shown by the list of politicians under investigation or condemned for undue links with mafia
organizations in Gomez and Travaglio (2008).
7
lems arising in a lawless society can potentially be alleviated with the emergence of a
third party that is able to enforce agreements. Sometimes, this role is taken on by crim-
inal organizations that use violence as their main feature (Gambetta, 1993; Franchetti,
1877). Other recent studies have focused on the peculiar conditions that may have fa-
vored the emergence of the Sicilian mafia (Bandiera, 2003; Del Monte and Pennacchio,
2012; Buonanno et al., 2015; Dimico, Isopi and Olsson, 2012). We extend this literature
by exploring the effects of organized crime on electoral outcomes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we develop our
theoretical model, followed by a section providing the necessary background on Italian
political competition and the interaction between politicians and the Sicilian mafia. We
then describe the data and present the empirical results. We then offer some concluding
remarks.
2 Theoretical framework
In the present section we model the effect on political competition of the presence of a
criminal organization which can sell votes to the chosen party thanks to its control of the
territory in one of the regions of a country.
We first set up a simple probabilistic model of electoral competition with a propor-
tional representation electoral rule and a single national constituency, two regions (1 and
2), and two parties (A, and B) competing for the government. We standardize the total
number of voters to 1 with the proportion n voting in region 1 and (1 − n) voting in re-
gion 2, where we assume the mafia is active. We adopt a modified version of the model in
Acemoglu, Robinson and Santos (2013) and we adapt its multi-constituency structure to
the present framework of a single national constituency with proportional representation.
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2.1 The political competition
As in the standard Downsian models we assume that parties can commit to a policy while
their ideological stand is fixed. So, denoting with θ˜k the ideological stance of party
k = A,B and with qk its (national) policy choice, as in Acemoglu, Robinson and Santos
(2013, p.12-13) we will assume that the utility of a voter i in region j when party k is in
government is
Ukij
(
qk, θ˜k
)
= uj
(
qk
)
− ψ
(
θ˜j − θ˜
k
)
+ ǫki .
The term uj
(
qk
)
is the utility that the individual gains from the policy choice qk, which
we will interpret as a national public good provided to all the citizen by the government
of party k. We denote by θ˜j the ideological bliss point in region j and therefore the
term ψ
(
θ˜j − θ˜
k
)
should be considered as the negative effect of the ideological distance
between all the voters in region j and party k. The term ǫki is the individual-specific utility
term which smooths the ideological preferences on the party in the region and it is such
that
ǫAi − ǫ
B
i = ǫi,
which is assumed to be uniformly distributed on the interval [-1/2,+1/2].
It is straightforward to see that the share of voters in region j voting for party A is:
sAj =
1
2
+ uj
(
qA
)
− uj
(
qB
)
+ θAj (1)
where θAj = ψ
(
θ˜j − θ˜
B
)
−ψ
(
θ˜j − θ˜
A
)
is the ideological advantage of partyA in region
j. We will assume throughout that partyA is the incumbent and has an overall ideological
advantage in the country.
In what follows we will make some simplifying assumptions which will help to iden-
tify a closed form solution to the policy competition game. In particular we will assume
that uj(q
k) = qk ∀j = 1, 2 and k = A,B. We will also assume that qk is the cost of
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delivering the policy party k is committed to.
2.2 The policy competition game in the presence of the mafia
The effect of the mafia presence in the region 2 is to deliver a number of votes m to the
party chosen.
The aim of both parties is to maximize their expected rent of being in power. Assum-
ing for the time being that the mafia is supporting party A, the expected rents of party A
and B are given by:
ΠA =
[
nsA
1
+ (1− n) sA
2
+m
] (
G− qA
)
−mpA
ΠB =
[
n
(
1− sA
1
)
+ (1− n)
(
1− sA
2
)
−m
] (
G− qB
)
where the probability of the party forming the government is given by the share of votes
gained in the elections (
[
nsA
1
+ (1− n) sA
2
+m
]
for party A).7 Denoting by G the gross
rent of being in office, the provision of public good qk, ∀k = A,B decreases the net rent
of party k when in government. Finally, the party supported by the mafia pays a total
amountmpA for its service, whether or not the party forms the government.
We model the interaction between the political parties and this intermediary in the
market for votes as a four-stage game of perfect information where, in the first stage, the
two political parties compete for mafia services by offering a price per vote pk. In the
second stage, the criminal organization chooses the party to support by picking the most
profitable offer. The third stage features the campaign competition where parties commit
to a level of public good provision if elected, while in the fourth stage the mafia chooses
the number of voters to divert in favor of the party it supports. This activity is costly for
the mafia, which will choose the number of voters to divert optimally (i.e., maximizing its
7See also Austen-Smith (2000); Baron and Diermeier (2001); Acemoglu, Robinson and Santos
(2013).
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profits). We look for the subgame-perfect equilibrium and solve the game by backward
induction.
Starting from the fourth stage, the mafia maximizes its profits by choosing the optimal
quantity of votes to switch, given the price offered by the party winning the competition
in the first stage. Assuming a quadratic cost function for the mafia, its profits are defined
as:
ΠM = p
km−
m2
2e
,
where pk is the price per vote offered by the party k = A,B winning the competition for
mafia support,m are the number of votes moved by the mafia to the advantage of party k,
and e is a cost parameter (the higher e the lower the marginal cost). The optimal number
of votes provided by the mafia is thereforem⋆ = epk.
In the third stage, the two parties engage in the policy competition by simultaneously
choosing the public good provision promises. However, one of the parties (party A) has
the mafia on its side. Substituting the expressions for the share of votes of the two par-
ties as in equation (1) and the equilibrium value of the votes provided by the mafia, the
expected rents become:
ΠA =
[
1
2
+ qA − qB + nθA
1
+ (1− n)θA
2
+ epA
] (
G− qA
)
− e(pA)2
ΠB =
[
1
2
+ qB − qA − nθA
1
− (1− n)θA
2
− epA
] (
G− qB
)
The equilibrium public good provision promises are given by:
qA⋆M = G−
1
2
−
nθA
1
+ (1− n)θA
2
+ epA
3
; qB⋆ = G−
1
2
+
nθA
1
+ (1− n)θA
2
+ epA
3
where the subscriptM indicates the party supported by the mafia.
In the second stage, the mafia selects the best offer. The party offering the highest
price per vote wins the mafia support.
11
Moving to the first stage, the parties simultaneously choose the price per vote to offer
to the mafia. Substituting the equilibrium values of the campaign competition strategies
and the optimizing behavior of the mafia into the expected rent of parties, if the mafia
supports party A, we obtain:
V AM =
(
1
2
+
nθA
1
+ (1− n)θA
2
+ epA
3
)2
− e(pA)2 (2)
V B =
(
1
2
−
nθA
1
+ (1− n)θA
2
+ epA
3
)2
(3)
where V Am and V
B are the expected rents gained by parties. If the competition for mafia
support is instead won by party B offering the price pB , the two expected rents are:
V A =
(
1
2
+
nθA
1
+ (1− n)θA
2
− epB
3
)2
(4)
V Bm =
(
1
2
−
nθA
1
+ (1− n)θA
2
− epB
3
)2
− e(pB)2 (5)
In stage 1, the parties compete à la Bertrand, trying to outbid the rival by offering a
higher price. There is an upper bound, however, on the price offered by the parties. By
comparing V km and V
k, with pk = p−k = p, it is easy to show that:
V Am ≥ V
A if pA ∈
[
0, pA
]
with pA =
2
3
+
4
9
(
nθA
1
+ (1− n)θA
2
)
(6)
V Bm ≥ V
B if pB ∈
[
0, pB
]
with pB =
2
3
−
4
9
(
nθA
1
+ (1− n)θA
2
)
(7)
When the price offered by the other party exceeds the upper bound, the party prefers to
lose the backing of the mafia to its rival.
There is also a minimum price the parties are willing to pay to the mafia. Since the
price offered also determines the quantity of votes switched by the mafia, each party has
an optimal (minimum) price that maximizes its expected rent when it is unconstrained by
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Figure 1: Reaction functions of the two parties in the competition for mafia sup-
port.
the rival party. The minimum price for party i is given by
pA =
3
2 (9− e)
+
nθA
1
+ (1− n)θA
2
9− e
(8)
pB =
3
2 (9− e)
−
nθA
1
+ (1− n)θA
2
9− e
(9)
The reaction functions of the parties in the first stage are depicted in Figure 1.
The following Proposition summarizes the outcome of competition for mafia support.
Proposition 1. The incumbent party always wins the competition to secure the backing
of the mafia.
The intuition behind the result is quite straightforward. Since the incumbent party
with the ideological advantage chooses a lower electoral promise, its marginal rentG−qk
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is larger than its rival’s and it is therefore willing to pay a higher price to the mafia for
each vote.
The equilibrium price offers to the mafia in the first stage can be defined as follows:8
pA⋆ =
2
3
−
4
9
[
nθA
1
+ (1− n)θA
2
]
; (10)
pB⋆ = ǫ, with ǫ ∈
[
0,
2
3
−
4
9
[
nθA
1
+ (1− n)θA
2
])
(11)
The number of votes shifted by the mafia in region 2 is therefore:
m⋆ = epA =
2
3
e−
4
9
[
nθA
1
+ (1− n)θA
2
]
e (12)
From equation (10) it is clear that the price paid by the winning party A is decreas-
ing in its electoral advantage. In the following Proposition we derive from this simple
intuition an empirically testable prediction which will guide our empirical analysis:
Proposition 2. The number of votes shifted by the mafia in region 2 to the advantage of
the incumbent and the price paid to the mafia for its electoral services increase when the
difference between the vote share of the two parties decreases in region 1.
A formal proof in provided in the appendix. The logic of the proof goes as follows.
Holding the other variables constant, the closer the competition in the region 1 the higher
the price the challenger is willing to pay to have mafia support in region 2, and thus the
higher the price the incumbent has to pay to outbid the rival. As the price increases, the
mafia will optimally choose to increase the number of votes shifted to the incumbent party
in order to increase its own profits. The intuition is quite straightforward: the relative
value of the mafia electoral services in region 2 increases when electoral competition
8The proof is a straightforward application of the Bertrand competition solution. We also
assume that the ideological advantage for party A is not too large and therefore the equilibrium
price paid to the mafia is determined by the maximum price the weaker party is willing to offer.
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strengthens in region 1. The amount of votes delivered by the mafia and mafia profits
derived from its electoral services increase accordingly.
3 Italian politics from 1946-92 and the Sicilianmafia
3.1 Italian politics after World War II
The postwar Italian political system between 1946 and 1992 was characterized by the
constant presence of the Christian Democratic Party (DC) as the leading party in the
government.9 With an average of almost 40% of the votes in the period considered, this
party dominated the government first in coalition with other small centrist parties and,
from 1963, also with the Socialist Party. The primacy of DC was never questioned and
the expectation was for this party to rule indefinitely. At least, this was the general belief
until the 1970s when the main opposition party, the Communist Party (PCI) became a
much stronger competitor and the risk of a leftist government led by the PCI became
more tangible. The difference between the support for these two parties in parliamentary
elections decreased dramatically and during the 1970s and 1980s was on average below
5%. Interestingly, the reduction in the gap did not occur in Sicily. In the regional elections
in 1970, the PCI won the right to govern major administrations in Italy for the first time.
In the regional and local elections in 1975, the PCI became the first party in 7 out of 15
regions and in all of the 10 largest Italian cities except for Palermo and Catania, the only
two located in Sicily.
9During the period considered the electoral law established a proportional system with a single
national constituency was uninterruptedly used from 1946 to 1992 in parliamentary elections for
the lower chamber with the possibility for voters to vote for up to 4 candidates from the party lists.
From 1994 the electoral rules changed, with 75% of MPs elected with a first-pass-the-post system
in each of the 475 electoral districts, with the rest of the MPs elected using a corrected proportional
system favouring the representation of minority parties.
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3.2 The relationship between the Sicilian mafia and politics
The relationship between organized crime and the political and administrative powers in
Sicily dates back to the origins of the mafia and the Italian state, in the XIX century.10
At the beginning of the fascist dictatorship, the mafia’s relationship with the political
power was interrupted by a tough repression that was started in 1925 by the prefect Mori,
but the mafia was not entirely eradicated. AfterWWII, many old mafiosi who had survived
the fascist era supported a Sicilian separatist movement, which did not succeed in the end.
Meanwhile, a new political force was emerging as the leading Italian governing party,
the DC, and several mafia bosses decided to move their political preference towards that
party.11
Supporting the incumbent party guaranteed several advantages to the mafia, which
could directly access important leading figures at the government level to defend its eco-
nomic interests (e.g., the allocation of public procurement contract in the areas of its ac-
tivities) and lobby for a softer legislation on mafia-related crimes, the protection of mafia
members at different levels in judicial trials, and lower investment in mafia-controlling
activities (Gambetta, 1993).
Two important Sicilian DC politicians with established mafia connections, Salvo Lima
and Vito Ciancimino, built their political careers in the city council of Palermo between
the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s, the years of the so-called “Sack of
Palermo”, when thousands of instances of planning permission were released that bene-
fited mafia families (CPM, 1976, pp. 230-4). Close connections between the mafia and
local politicians were recorded in the final report of the first Parliamentary Committee on
10See Dickie (2004, pp. 87-130) for an interesting account of Palermo high society and its
relationship with the mafia. Also, see Salvemini (1910) for a crude account of the relationship
between the national political establishment and the mafia in the two decades from 1890 to 1910.
11For instance, two mafia bosses, Calogero Vizzini and Giuseppe Genco Russo, previous may-
ors of Villalba and Mussumeli respectively, became members of the DC in 1947; see Romano
(1966, pp. 316-7) and Lupo (1996, p.232).
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the Sicilian mafia, which noted that “the city council of Trapani numbered 15 relatives of
identified mafia members, while there were 16 in the Caltanissetta council and 20 in the
Agrigento council” (CPM, 1976, p.217).
During the 1970s and the 1980s, partly as a result of the gradual increase in elec-
toral competition at the national level, the relationship between the mafia and the DC
became more solid (Arlacchi 2010, CPM 1993, Paoli 2003). Discussing the behavior of
the mafia on electoral matters in the 1980s, Baldassarre di Maggio explains that “there
was an ‘obligation’ for all men of honor to vote for the Christian Democrats. The unan-
imous conviction was that we could usefully influence, through politicians, the courts’
action and, furthermore, that the function of Sicilian politicians was imperative for ‘Ro-
man politics’ concerning Sicilian matters and, especially, involving Cosa Nostra” (Paoli,
2003, p. 202). Gaspare Mutolo provided an interesting account on the political role of
the mafia in support of DC when the threat of a strong Communist party became more
tangible: “[...] the DC was in trouble because the left parties were gaining strength and if
we didn’t make an effort to gain votes... In fact, had it not been for Sicily and Southern
Italy, DC would have lost its majority.” (CPM 1993, p. 1288).
There is considerable judicial evidence that the mafia was supporting the DC. For
instance, it has been established in several trials that Salvo Lima, Vito Ciancimino and
Ignazio Salvo, some of the most relevant Sicilian DC politicians, were closely associated
with or even members of the most important mafia families (Dickie, 2004, pp. 227, 253,
283). According to a court ruling, even the late MP Giulio Andreotti, seven times Italian
Prime Minister, “made himself available to mafiosi in an authentic, stable and friendly
way until the spring of 1980” (Dickie, 2004, pp. 322-3).
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4 Data
We gathered electoral data for all Sicilian municipalities from the Italian Ministry of
Home Affairs.12 The number of municipalities changed during the period considered,
mainly because new municipalities were created. We aggregated the data back into the
370 municipalities existing in 1951. We focus on the 12 elections for the lower chamber
from 1946 to 1992, the period referred to as the “First Republic”. After 1992, a political
earthquake took place in Italy, radically transforming both the spectrum of parties in the
political arena and the electoral system. Therefore, any comparison between elections be-
fore and after 1992 would be extremely challenging and is beyond the scope of the present
work.13
Our dependent variable is the share of votes obtained by DC, the incumbent party
throughout the period considered, computed for each election as the number of votes
obtained in a given municipality, divided by the total number of valid votes expressed in
that municipality.
The data on the distribution of the mafia across Sicily are taken from a report by
the military police (carabinieri) submitted in 1987 to a parliamentary committee (CG
Carabinieri, 1987). The report analyzes the activities of organized crime in Italy and lists
the main mafia families, providing for each of them the name of the boss and the town in
12Available at: www.interno.gov.it.
13We focus of the election for the low chamber since the electoral law stipulating a unique
electoral district for the entire country lend itself well to our identification strategy. One vote
lost in the rest of Italy could be “replaced” by one vote in Sicily delivered by the mafia, thereby
strongly increasing the incentives for the incumbent to obtain the support of the mafia when the
competition in the rest of Italy increases. For the Senate the electoral law was radically different,
featuring 22 electoral districts only for Sicily with a first-past-the-post system with a qualified
majority. In districts where the qualified majority was not reached, votes were aggregated at the
regional level and seats allocated according to a proportional rule. Hence, the electoral law for the
Senate elections does not map well into the logic of our theoretical model nor our identification
strategy. In appendix Tables A6-A7 we replicate our main estimations also for the Senate elections
over the same period. Even though the sign of the effect remains consistent with our findings for
the low chamber, results are never statistically significant.
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which it was based.14 Gambetta (1993, p.82) uses the data provided by this report in a map
to compare the mafia presence in the 19th and 20th centuries; however, these data have
never been used in an empirical investigation. 80 Sicilian municipalities are identified in
the report as mafia strongholds of the main families, with the vast majority in the provinces
of Palermo, Agrigento and Trapani. We create the dummy variable mafia1987, which
takes the value one when the municipality is listed in the report as a stronghold of a mafia
family. In Figure 2 we display the mafia distribution according to this source.
Figure 2: Mafia distribution in Sicily (CG Carabinieri, 1987).
We also use two alternative measures for the mafia presence. First, a news-based
measure of the presence of the mafia that has been compiled by researchers of a research
center on the mafia at the University of Messina (CSDCM, Università di Messina, 1994).
14In those years, the knowledge of the structure of Cosa Nostra was greatly enhanced by the
testimony of several important mafiosi turned state’s evidence. Their contribution was vital to the
most important trial against the Sicilian mafia, the maxiprocesso (Maxi Trial), which started in
1986 and ended in December 1987 when 342 alleged mafiosi were sentenced to a total of 2665
years in addition to 19 life sentences. In January 1992 the Italian Supreme Court largely confirmed
the verdict of the Maxi Trial. A few months later, two of the prosecutors, Judges G. Falcone and
P. Borsellino, were murdered in two separate bomb attacks.
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They have produced a map with details of all the mafia families cited in the news, and the
municipalities in which they have been reported to have had an influence. Based on this,
we create a dummy variable, mafia1994, taking the value one for municipalities where
the mafia operates. We use this measure as a robustness check of our preferred measure
of the mafia.
Second, a measure of mafia prevalence in 1900, by municipality, is derived by Cutrera
(1900), and it is used to instrument for more recent mafia distribution.15 We create the
variablemafia1900 with values ranging from 0 (no mafia), to 3 (strong mafia presence).
Instrumenting recent mafia presence with a measure of the geographical distribution of
mafia in 1900, at least 50 years away from the period considered in this study, addresses
potential reversed causality concerns. It is rather unlikely that the relationship between
mafia and politics in the period 1946-1992 may have affected the geographical distribution
of the criminal organization at the start of the century.
In line with the historical pattern of Italian politics during the First Republic, our main
measure of electoral competition is the difference between the votes gained by the PCI and
the DC, the two largest parties across the period considered. We compute the difference
between PCI and DC in parliamentary elections excluding the votes coming from Sicily
to avoid endogeneity. This provides the most appropriate measure, as it captures the
incentives for the DC to accept mafia electoral services, given the margin of advantage it
expects to enjoy at the national level.
As an alternative measure, less directly linked to Italian politics, we compute an index
of the strength of communism at the global level. For each election year in our sample
we record the number of national states ruled by a communist regime. We then normalize
this total dividing it by the maximal number of communist states recorded in the period
15Police Inspector Antonino Cutrera analyzed the origins and the characteristics of the mafia,
its role in Sicilian history, its initiation rituals and its structure. Based on his knowledge of the
mafia both in Palermo and in the rest of the highland, he drew a map of the presence and intensity
of the mafia in 289 municipalities and villages.
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considered. Even though the index is based on international politics, it clearly captures the
relative strength of the major threat to the DC primacy on Italian politics: the diffusion
of the communist ideology. Figure 3 clearly shows that the two measures of electoral
competition are strongly correlated.
Figure 3: Electoral competition faced by DC in 1946-1992.
We collect an extensive set of socio-demographic and economic controls at munici-
pality level, computed by interpolation for elections years, from the official censuses for
1951, 1961, 1971, 1981, 1991, and 2001.
To capture the level of public investment, we gather data on the net change in public
capital stock divided by the population from Picci (2002) as a proxy for the (per capita)
public investment, which is available only at the provincial level for the relevant period.
We sum the public investment occurring in the electoral year and in the four years preced-
ing each election to obtain a measure of total public investment.
We also control for the degree of remoteness and potential isolation of each munici-
pality, using three geographic variables: the average slope (difference between maximum
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and minimum altitudes divided by area), the distance from the provincial capital, and the
altitude of the main center of the municipality.
Finally, to control for the presence of the Catholic Church in Sicilian municipalities
we add data on dioceses and parishes from the 1951 census. In particular, we compute
the number of parishes for every 1000 inhabitants at the municipality level, and a dummy
variable that takes the value of one if the municipality was one of the 20 episcopal sees
of the Catholic Church in Sicily in 1951. These are particularly important variables as
we want to control for any factors influencing the voting for a party that clearly identified
itself as representing the followers of the Catholic Church.
Both the church presence and geographic controls, which are time invariant, are inter-
acted with a full set of year dummies to control for any time trends in political preferences
related to these initial municipality characteristics. The full list of controls is described in
Table 1.
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
5 Empirical strategy
In line with the results of our two-region model, we expect the electoral deal between the
mafia and the incumbent party to be more salient in the region with the mafia when the
competition by the second strongest party gets tougher in the other region. In the context
considered, this generates two testable predictions: when electoral competition with PCI
in the rest of Italy is closer (i) the incumbent party DC should obtain more votes in mafia
municipalities; and (ii) the mafia should derive higher profits from its electoral services.
To identify the first side of the deal, we compare the share of votes awarded to DC
(Share DCit) in Italian parliamentary elections across Sicilian municipalities with and
without mafia, using the closeness of elections in the rest of Italy as a source of exogenous
variation. We therefore interact the difference between PCI and DC in the rest of Italy
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for each election in our database with our mafia measure. The empirical identification
strategy relies on the comparison between the relative electoral performance of the DC
across municipalities with and without mafia presence as a result of a change in political
competition.
Formally, our base empirical model can be written as follows:
Share DCit = γ mafia1987i ∗ electoral competitiont + αi + δt + ǫit (13)
where αi control for municipality fixed effects, δt is a set of year dummies capturing the
time-specific variance in electoral outcomes, and ǫit is the standardized error term clus-
tered at the municipality level. The coefficient of interest is γ, which captures the impact
of the mafia on the electoral performance due to the change in electoral competition faced
by the DC in the rest of Italy.
Identifying the second part of the electoral deal, and hence empirical evidence of
a change in the “electoral” profits of the mafia, is much more challenging. There is a
plethora of channels that may have been used by the DC to reward the mafia for its support:
softer legislation on mafia-related crimes, direct intervention to protect mafia members at
different levels in judicial trials, and lower investment in mafia-controlling activities are
among the most relevant channels (Gambetta, 1993). Unfortunately, these channels do
not easily lend themselves to quantitative analysis.
An admittedly partial test is to look at the magnitude of typical legal economic activ-
ities of the mafia that can either be fostered or constrained by the public authorities. We
focus on the construction industry. The mafia is known to infiltrate and capture a substan-
tial share of public procurement, and to regularly reinvest much of the revenue from its
illicit activities in private construction. Public authorities may allow wilder urban expan-
sion, overriding existing regulations, or obscurely award public contracts to mafia-related
entrepreneurs to reward mafia’s electoral support.
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Once more, it is interesting to consider what mafiosi turned state’s evidence have to
say on the issue. LeonardoMessina, talking about the control of votes his family exercised
in Caltanissetta, claims that they did it in exchange for money or other favors but “[...] the
ultimate goal is public procurement contracts”.16
We do not have data on public procurement contracts by municipality, nor do we have
data on direct urban expansion. Instead, we use the share of workers in construction over
the total labor force as a proxy for the intensity of construction activities. It is reasonable
to assume that if more construction works were allowed in the municipalities in which
the mafia operated, then a larger labor force would be employed in this sector. Also,
if public construction contracts were awarded to mafia-controlled enterprises, we would
expect these firms to employ a disproportionate number of workers from mafia stronghold
municipalities, as they would give preference to mafia members, their families and their
friends.
We regress the share of workers in construction over the total labor force on the inter-
action term between the mafia proxy and our measures of electoral competition. Formally,
we reestimate equation (13) by replacing the dependent variable with the share of workers
in construction over the total labor force (Share constructionit).
We gradually augment our basic specification of the two models with the set of time-
varying contemporaneous public expenditure, the sets of socio-demographic and eco-
nomic controls, the time-invariant geographic controls and the church presence controls
interacted with the full set of year dummies.
A significant correlation in equation (13), however, may not represent a causal re-
lationship. For instance, it may be explained by reverse causality: the mafia may have
grown stronger as a result of blunt (DC-led) government repression policies adopted in
exchange for the electoral support obtained. Moreover, our mafia variables are prone to
measurement error since the mafia presence is captured with a dummy variable that only
16This is an extract from his testimony before a parliamentary committee (CPM, 1992b, p.553).
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identifies mafia strongholds and not its areas of influence. To address these concerns, we
turn to an instrumental variable (IV) strategy.
We instrument for our interaction termmafia1987i ∗ electoral competitiont using
the interaction of electoral competition with a measure of mafia presence (mafia1900)
recorded by Cutrera (1900) 42 years before the DC was even founded.17
To be a valid instrument, mafia1900i ∗ electoral competitiont should not be cor-
related with the error term in equation (13) and therefore with any omitted variables cor-
related with the electoral outcome. We believe that the mafia presence in 1900 can affect
the electoral outcome 50 years later only through the instrumented variable mafia1987.
Even though the Sicilian mafia may have influenced politics in 1900, the political system
then changed dramatically, and the one arising from the ruins of the Second World War
was radically different.18
6 Empirical results
6.1 OLS results
Table 2 reports the results of estimating our equation (13).
17We also tried sulfur historical production at the municipality level an alternative instrument,
following Buonanno et al. (2015), who show that the presence of sulfur mines favored the early
development of the Sicilian mafia. Unfortunately, sulfur seems to be a good predictor of the his-
torical distribution of the Sicilian mafia (mafia1900), but it generates a very weak first stage with
mafia1987. In appendix, we report our IV results using both mafia1900 and sulfur production
as excluded instruments. All main results hold.
18In 1900, Italy was a monarchy in which only 6.78% of the population (12% of the adult
population) had the right to vote, and members of parliament were elected through a first-past-
the-post system in which parties played little role. Furthermore, in 1922 Mussolini took power,
initiating a 20-year fascist dictatorship that constituted a dramatic break in the Italian political
system’s evolution toward democracy. When the fascist dictatorship ended and Mussolini was
executed, the monarchy was also abolished, and a Democratic Republic was established in 1946.
The elections from 1946 to 1992 have all been characterized by universal suffrage and a purely
proportional electoral rule with a single national constituency.
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The coefficient of interest, capturing the impact of electoral competition in mafia mu-
nicipalities, is positive but statistically not significant in the first column, where we control
only for municipality and elections fixed effects. With the inclusion of public expenditure
controls in column (2), however, the coefficient increases in size and becomes statistically
significant. This remain true in the further four columns in which socio-demographic, eco-
nomic, geographic and Church controls, respectively, are included in the model. When
the competition of the PCI increases in the rest of Italy, the vote share of DC increases in
Sicilian municipalities plagued by mafia. The magnitude of the impact is considerable:
based on the results reported in column (6), where we control for our full set of controls,
a decrease of the gap between DC and PCI by one percentage point translates into an
average increase of DC vote share by 0.2 percentage points in mafia municipalities. The
largest drop in the DC - PCI difference witnessed within the period considered (about
17 percentage points between the 1958 and the 1983 elections), would then lead to an
increase of DC vote shares in mafia municipality by about 3.5 percentage points. This
provides a first piece of empirical evidence on the impact of mafia on electoral outcomes.
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
Turning to the other side of the electoral deal, in Table 3 we report the results of
estimating our model with the share of labor force employed in construction as dependent
variable.
Again, the model in the first column includes municipality and elections fixed effects
along with the interaction term of interest. We then gradually augment our model with
the different sets of controls. The coefficient of interest is positive throughout the dif-
ferent specifications, and becomes significant after the inclusion of economic controls.
When the competition by the PCI increases in the rest of Italy, the share of the labor force
employed in construction (and therefore construction activities themselves) increases in
Sicilian municipalities where the mafia operates. As for the magnitude of the impact,
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based on the results reported in column (6), where we control for our full set of controls,
a decrease of the gap between DC and PCI by one percentage point translates into an
average increase of the share of the labor force employed in construction by 0.08 percent-
age points in mafia municipalities. To help appreciate the magnitude of the impact, the
largest drop in the DC - PCI difference witnessed within the period considered (about 17
percentage points) implies an increase of the share of the labor force employed in con-
struction in mafia municipality by about 1.4 percentage points. Since the average share
of construction workers over the labor force in our full sample is 12%, this represents a
substantial effect.
A potential concern is that the differential change in the composition of labor force
may simply track party preferences towards construction activities. To address this con-
cern, we show in the appendix (Table A1) that the relationship between DC votes shares
and the share of labor force employed in construction activities is always negative and
never statistically significant across the period studied.
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
Despite the comprehensive set of control included in our complete models, the results
in Tables 2 and 3, may still be prone to endogeneity bias. To address these concerns,
in the next section we turn to our instrumental variable to establish the causality of the
relationship uncovered.
6.2 IV results
In Table 4 we show our IV results of the impact of the mafia on DC vote shares.19 As for
the OLS results, we report in the first column the results of the estimation of the most par-
simonious model, in which only municipality and elections fixed effects are controlled for.
19First-stage results are reported in Table A2 in the appendix.
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In the further columns we gradually include the various sets of controls. The Kleibergen-
Paap F statistics confirm that the instrument is clearly relevant in all specifications.
The IV estimates confirm the pattern of OLS findings: when the gap between DC and
PCI in the rest of Italy shrinks, DC systematically obtains a larger share of the vote in
the Sicilian municipalities where the mafia operates. The coefficient of interest is positive
and significant across all specifications of the model. The estimates also substantiate our
concerns about the potential endogeneity of the location of the mafia. Indeed, the magni-
tude of the effect is larger than that found using OLS. According to the results reported
in column (6), where we include our full set of controls, a drop of the gap between DC
and PCI in the rest of Italy by one percentage point implies an average increase of DC
vote share by almost 0.8 percentage points. Put it differently, the presence of the mafia
increased the share of the votes gained by the DC by about 13 percentage points on aver-
age, as a consequence of the largest 17 percentage points drop in the DC - PCI difference
witnessed within the period considered in the rest of Italy. The larger IV coefficients may
be explained partially by the measurement error in the recording of mafia presence, as
mafia1987 is a simple dummy variable. The gap between OLS and IV results, however,
may also suggest that DC were particularly keen in having the mafia support in munici-
palities in which they felt relatively politically disadvantaged. Over time mafia may have
prospered and grown more exactly in those municipalities, i.e. where DC on average ob-
tained less votes. This interpretation is compatible with the downward bias of our OLS
estimates.
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
Interestingly, our estimation of the impact that mafia had on electoral results lies in the
same order of magnitude of the accounts of ex-mafia members. For instance, Antonino
Calderone, a mafioso turned state’s evidence, reported, “in the province of Palermo alone,”
the mafia can count on “75,000-100,000 votes in favor of political parties and friendly
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politicians” (Arlacchi, 2010, p.183). The voters in the province of Palermo, an area with
a high mafia presence, were between 460,000 and 786,000 in the period under scrutiny.
The 13 additional percentage points awarded on average to the DC in mafia-ridden mu-
nicipalities, as a result of the largest change in electoral competition faced by the DC in
our sample, would imply that the mafia was able to move between 60,000 and 102,000
votes in that province!
The results presented so far document a dramatic increase in the electoral manipu-
lation conducted by the mafia in favor of the DC in response to increases in electoral
competition. A full investigation of the mechanisms through which the mafia was able
to deliver votes lies outside of the scope of the present work. It is, however, interesting
to question where the extra votes delivered to the DC were originating. In particular, re-
ferring to the common political spectrum, was the mafia “reorienting” votes from parties
lying on the left or on the right of the DC? In the appendix (Table A3) we show that there
is some evidence that votes were moved from the left parties, which confirms that the
development of strong leftist parties was perceived by the DC as the actual danger to its
hegemony.20 This further reinforces our identification strategy relying on the change in
the relative competition by the PCI.
Let us now revisit the second part of the electoral deal within the context of our IV
strategy. Table 5 reports the results of our IV models investigating the effects of the elec-
toral services of mafia on (its) construction activities. As usual, we report in the first
column the results of the estimation of the most parsimonious model, in which only mu-
nicipality and elections fixed effects are included. In the further columns, we gradually
include the other sets of controls. Again, the first stage F statistics confirm that the instru-
ment is clearly relevant in all specifications. The patterns found in our OLS results are
confirmed: the coefficient of interest is positive and significant across all specifications of
20Table A3 also shows that turnout does not change differently across mafia and other munici-
palities in response to changes in electoral competition.
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the model, meaning that reducing the gap between DC and PCI in the rest of Italy leads
to an increase of the construction activities in mafia municipalities. The magnitude of
the impact increases with respect to our OLS results. According to the figures in column
(6), a decrease in the DC - PCI difference in the rest of Italy by one percentage point
translate into an increase of the share of labor force employed in construction in mafia
municipalities by 0.27 percentage points. Looking at the impact of the largest drop in the
DC - PCI difference witnessed within the period considered (about 17 percentage points),
we obtain a stunning increase of the share of the labor force employed in construction in
mafia municipality by about 4.5 percentage points.21
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE
Therefore, we can be fairly confident that the increase in construction activities in
municipalities in which the mafia operated was at least partially the byproduct of the elec-
toral deal linking the DC, which was constantly in government in the period considered,
and the Sicilian mafia.
Overall our IV results confirm and strengthen the results of the previous section. Dur-
ing the period considered, DC electoral dominance was supported by the Sicilian mafia.
The extent of the involvement of mafia in electoral matter is strongly associated with
increases in construction activities in mafia municipalities, which is consistent with the
mafia receiving preferential treatment in the construction sector by the public authorities
as a tacit reward for its electoral services.
21Tables A4-A5 replicate our IV estimates for DC vote shares and construction workers, us-
ing as additional excluded instrument sulfur production in 1860s interacted with our competition
measure. Results remain qualitatively identical.
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6.3 Further robustness checks
We run four sets of robustness checks and two falsification exercises.22 The first set of
robustness tests addresses a concern which may potentially affect our identification strat-
egy. In the second set, we test whether the heterogeneity of the impact of mafia presence
on electoral outcomes over time tracks the levels of competition brought about by the
PCI. The third one aims at further refining our identification strategy. The fourth set
replicates the estimation of our benchmark models adopting an alternative measure of
mafia presence, collected by the University of Messina in 1994, and an alternative mea-
sure of electoral competition. The first falsification exercise replicates the analysis using
the difference between the only two other sizable parties which participated to all elec-
tions throughout the period studied.23 Finally, the second falsification exercise analyzes
the impact of the change in electoral competition on the share of labor force employed
in different sectors, to show that construction activities are indeed special due to their
prominence among the legal economic activities by the mafia.
A potential concern may affect our identification strategy. Increasing electoral compe-
tition is known to mobilize inactive voters, thereby increasing turnout. If mafia municipal-
ities were on average more leaning towards DC for some pre-existent reasons (unrelated
to mafia presence), then the rise in turnout would imply an increase in DC vote shares in
mafia municipalities, unrelated to the mafia electoral services. The figures reported in Ta-
ble 1 already provide a solid base to dismiss this potential concern. Mafia municipalities
feature on average lower DC vote shares across our sample. So, according to this mech-
anism, an increasing turnout resulting from electoral competition should penalize DC in
mafia municipalities. We can test more explicitly for this mechanism by including in our
main equation the average vote shares awarded by DC and PCI in the first 4 elections
22We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting some of these tests.
23We exclude the Socialist Party as it went through several reforms throughout the period and
because it could theoretically have a similar effect as the competition by the Communist Party,
although to a lower degree.
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in our sample (run before 1960) interacted with year dummies. The model is then esti-
mated on the sample of the remaining 8 elections. The results, reported in Table6, largely
confirm our previous findings.
TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE
The second test explores the heterogeneity of the impact of mafia presence on elec-
toral outcomes over time. The electoral distance of PCI from the incumbent DC varies
over time, and in particular it becomes minimal at the end of the 1970s and during the
1980s. We therefore create a set of interaction terms betweenmafia1987 and time dum-
mies which identify the elections of different decades: 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s (which
includes also 1992). We then estimate a model in which the interaction term between
mafia and the competition variable is replaced by these interaction terms. The results, in
column 1 and 2 of Table7, confirm DC obtained substantially more votes in mafia mu-
nicipalities particularly in the 1970s and 1980s, where PCI competition became stronger.
Columns 3 and 4 report the results of estimating an alternative model in which we in-
clude only an interaction term between mafia1987 and a post-1970 dummy identifying
all elections taking place after 1970. Again, the results show that DC obtained substan-
tially more votes in mafia municipalities after 1970. The rest of the Table7, in which
we estimate the corresponding models for the share of construction workers, displays a
relatively similar pattern.
TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE
The interpretation of all results presented so far hinges on a key assumption: mafia
and non mafia municipalities should be similar with respect to any unobservable which
may trigger different DC vote shares in response to a decrease in the gap between DC
and the Communist Party. In Table 8 we propose three alternative IV specifications which
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increase our confidence that this assumption is likely to hold. In the first column, we inter-
act our (geographical and Church) time invariant controls with the electoral competition
measure, thereby controlling for the differential response voters may have to an decrease
in the gap between DC and PCI depending on the degree of Church presence in, and geo-
graphical remoteness/isolation (i.e. elevation, slope, distance to provincial capital) of the
municipality. The coefficient of interest is barely affected.24
TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE
In column (2) we minimize the difference in unobservables between mafia and non
mafia municipalities restricting our analysis on the sample of mafia municipalities and
municipalities directly bordering with them. The results remain almost identical, which
is particularly noteworthy, given the loss of almost half of the sample.
Finally, we replace municipality fixed effects with a full set of neighbor-pair dum-
mies, each identifying a mafia municipality and a neighboring municipality, and the full
set of neighbor-pair dummies interacted with our electoral competition measure.25 The
results of this exercise, reported in column (3), confirm the pattern: mafia municipali-
ties experience a larger increase in DC vote shares in response to a decrease in the gap
between DC and PCI as compared to neighboring mafia free municipalities.
In the rest of Table 8 we implement the same three exercises in the context of the
model studying construction activities. Interacting time-invariant controls with electoral
competition does not affect the result (column (4)). When we restrict the analysis to
mafia and directly neighboring municipalities, we obtain an almost identical coefficient
but not statistically significant, most likely due to the loss of almost half of the sample
which substantially increases the standard error. Finally, the results disappear when we
24Interacting also all time-varying controls produces very similar results.
25In particularly mafia-dense areas, we had to pair two mafia municipalities with the same
neighboring mafia-free municipality, or with geographically close, but not directly neighboring
municipalities.
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allow for neighbor-pair specific changes in construction activities in reaction to electoral
competition. Beside the loss of more than half of the sample, a more likely explanation
is that the impact of an increase of construction activities in mafia municipalities is likely
to generate substantial positive spillovers in neighboring municipalities, typically located
only a few kilometers away.
Moving to the fourth set of robustness check, the first two columns of Table 9 reports
the results of estimating our OLS and IV models with the alternative measure of mafia,
mafia1994. Columns (1) and (2) show the result of the model investigating the impact of
mafia on DC vote shares, whereas columns (3) and (4) report the impact on construction
activities. In both cases we include the full set of controls. Overall, the adoption of an
alternative measure of mafia does not disrupt our main results and even the magnitude of
the impacts are relatively similar.
TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE
In columns (5) to (8), we report the results of our OLS and IV full models when
adopting an alternative measure of electoral competition faced by the DC, less directly
linked with Italian politics: an index of the strength of communism at the global level,
computed as the number of national states ruled by a communist regime, normalized by
the maximal number of communist states recorded in the period considered. Since the
main electoral concern for DC was the growth of PCI, the measure clearly captures the
intensity of the threat to DC political hegemony. Again, while columns (5) and (6) focus
on DC votes shares, columns (7) and (8) show the result of the OLS and IV models on
construction workers, respectively.
The positive and significant coefficients for the presence of mafia interacted with the
international strength of communism confirms the pattern found in Tables 2 and 4: the DC
gained more votes in mafia municipalities when the communism was relatively stronger
internationally. This confirms that the growth of communism was indeed representing a
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capital concern for DC leadership. Similarly, the results in the last two columns confirm
that when communism was stronger worldwide, the share of labor force employed in
construction activities was higher in mafia municipalities. Overall, the results of this
exercise strongly confirm the previous patterns.
Next, we present our two falsification exercises. In Table 10 we report the results
of first one, in which our measure of electoral competition is replaced by the difference
between the vote shares obtained by the Italian Republican Party (PRI) and the Italian
Social Movement (MSI) in the rest of Italy (excluding Sicily). Both parties were capturing
substantial shares of votes (up to 9%) at the national level over the period considered. The
first two columns study the impact on DC vote shares, whereas the last two columns focus
of the construction activities. Columns (1) and (3) report the OLS results, and columns
(2) and (4) report the IV results. The difference between PRI and MSI did not spark any
differential change in DC vote shares across mafia and non mafia municipalities. The
same holds true when considering the impact on construction activities.
TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE
The second falsification exercise addresses a potential concern affecting our results
on construction activities. The effect of electoral competition on construction activities in
mafia municipalities may, in fact, capture a general trend in economic activities in mafia
municipalities and have little to do with the electoral deal we are studying. To address this
concern and highlight the peculiarity of the construction sector, characterized by a high
degree of mafia activities, in Table11 we report the results of a falsification test in which
we assess whether the share of workers in the manufacturing, banking, communications
industries and public sector are similarly affected by the mafia presence in response to
changes in electoral competition. No similar positive effect is found, except in the case
of public sector, for which our IV model suggests that public employment increases more
in mafia municipalities following more contested elections. This could be due to public
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employment being used as reward for mafia-related individuals in exchange for its elec-
toral services, but may also flag that mafia municipalities are intrinsically more prone
to clientelism. We therefore replicate the test on the sample of mafia and neighboring
municipalities only and in our neighbor-pair fixed effect specification, to test whether
mafia municipalities differ with respect to their neighbors in the way public employment
changes with electoral competition. We find (columns 9-10) that this is not the case. Since
spillover effects are much less reasonable in the public sector, we interpret this as evidence
that the level of clientelism is similar across mafia municipalities and their neighbors.
TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE
7 Conclusions
In this paper we study the impact of organized crime on electoral outcomes. Using a two-
region theoretical model we identify electoral competition as a key determinant affecting
the incentives for an incumbent party to engage in electoral deals with a criminal organi-
zation present in one of the regions: deals with organized crime become more salient and
more decisive in the presence of strong electoral competition. Guided by the predictions
of the model and using Sicily as a case study, we document the impact of the Sicilian
mafia on parliamentary elections in the period 1946-92. We find evidence consistent with
the existence of an electoral deal between the mafia and the Christian Democrats (DC):
an intensification in the electoral competition faced by the DC in the rest of the country
(mainly due to the dynamics of the Italian Communist Party, PCI) consistently increased
its share of the vote in municipalities in which the mafia operated, as compared to the
other Sicilian municipalities. The results are robust to a variety of specifications includ-
ing an instrumental variable strategy in which recent mafia presence is instrumented with
its distribution in 1900, and to the adoption of alternative measures of mafia and elec-
toral competition, one of which entirely external to Italian politics. The magnitude of
36
the impact is substantial: according to our preferred specification the largest drop in the
DC - PCI difference witnessed within the period considered (about 17 percentage points
between the 1958 and the 1983 elections), would lead to an increase of DC vote shares in
mafia municipality by about 13 percentage points.
What did the mafia get in exchange for its support? This side of the electoral deal
is more difficult to disentangle as the channels through which politicians may have paid
the mafia back are multiple. We provide suggestive evidence that one channel has been
through construction activities, either through the facilitation of private (legal and illegal)
developments, or the awarding of public construction contracts to companies with close
ties to the mafia.
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Tables
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max
Dependent variables:
Votes Share of Christian Democrats in Sicily 4440 0.445 0.129 0.039 0.938
in Mafia1987 municipalities 936 0.427 0.120 0.079 0.938
in other municipalities 3504 0.450 0.131 0.039 0.873
Construction workers over labor force 4440 0.123 0.070 0.000 0.436
Mafia measure:
Mafia1987 370 0.211 0.408 0.000 1.000
Mafia1994 370 0.278 0.448 0.000 1.000
Mafia1900 308 1.396 1.145 0.000 3.000
Electoral competition measures:
PCI - DC vote shares 4440 -0.1133 0.539 -0.196 -0.019
International strength of communism 4440 0.703 0.237 0.217 1
Public expenditure controls:
Public investments per capita in the last 5 years 108 0.265 0.435 0.001 7.294
Socio-demographic controls:
Log(population) 4440 8.685 1.055 5.579 13.460
Density 4440 2.647 4.107 0.044 52.973
Share of population under 25 4440 0.415 0.060 0.216 0.592
Share of population over 60 4440 0.170 0.054 0.042 0.407
Share of homemaker over population 4440 0.237 0.094 0.013 0.510
Houses without basic services per capita 4440 0.034 0.065 0.000 0.460
Share of illiterate population 4440 0.132 0.078 0.008 0.448
Share of population with university degree 4440 0.010 0.009 0.000 0.098
Share of female population with university degree 4440 0.004 0.004 0.000 0.043
Economic controls:
Share of labor force employed in agriculture 4440 0.471 0.218 0.022 1.000
Share of female labor force 4440 0.215 0.128 0.000 0.505
Males in search of first occupation over labor force 4440 0.071 0.057 0.000 0.536
Geographic variables:
Slope (max height – min height divided by area) 370 0.283 0.336 0.007 3.711
Distance from the province capital 370 36.394 25.298 0.000 219.503
Altitude of the main center 370 0.399 0.275 0.001 1.275
Church presence:
Number of parishes per 1000 inhabitants in 1951 370 0.416 0.379 0.055 3.851
Diocese seat dummy in 1951 370 0.051 0.221 0.000 1.00042
Table 2: The impact of mafia on DC electoral outcome - OLS results
Dependent variable: Votes Share of Christian Democrats
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mafia1987 × PCI-DC shares 0.146 0.172* 0.199** 0.185** 0.224** 0.220**
(0.0936) (0.0915) (0.0885) (0.0876) (0.0944) (0.0956)
Public expenditure controls     
Socio-demographic controls    
Economic controls   
Geographic controls  
Church controls 
Year FE      
Municipality FE      
Observations 4,440 4,440 4,440 4,440 4,440 4,440
Municipalities 370 370 370 370 370 370
R-squared 0.147 0.155 0.183 0.184 0.198 0.203
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at municipality level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. FE
= fixed effects.
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Table 3: The impact of mafia on construction activities - OLS results
Dependent variable: Share of construction workers over labor force
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mafia1987 × PCI-DC shares 0.0324 0.0348 0.0214 0.0878** 0.101** 0.0852**
(0.0527) (0.0530) (0.0480) (0.0387) (0.0405) (0.0401)
Public expenditure controls     
Socio-demographic controls    
Economic controls   
Geographic controls  
Church controls 
Year FE      
Municipality FE      
Observations 4,440 4,440 4,440 4,440 4,440 4,440
Municipalities 370 370 370 370 370 370
R-squared 0.568 0.568 0.644 0.756 0.765 0.771
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at municipality level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. FE
= fixed effects.
4
4
Table 4: The impact of mafia on DC electoral outcome - IV results
Dependent variable: Votes Share of Christian Democrats
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mafia1987 × PCI-DC shares 0.455* 0.479** 0.511** 0.543** 0.664*** 0.809***
(0.242) (0.238) (0.239) (0.244) (0.248) (0.269)
Public expenditure controls     
Socio-demographic controls    
Economic controls   
Geographic controls  
Church controls 
Year FE      
Municipality FE      
Observations 3,696 3,696 3,696 3,696 3,696 3,696
Municipalities 308 308 308 308 308 308
R-squared -0.008 0.183 0.200 0.201 0.212 0.219
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 70.36 70.33 69.83 64.63 68.70 60.33
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at municipality level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. FE
= fixed effects.
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Table 5: The impact of mafia on construction activities - IV results
Dependent variable: Share of construction workers over labor force
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mafia1987 × PCI-DC shares 0.267** 0.270** 0.301** 0.284*** 0.285*** 0.231**
(0.129) (0.129) (0.124) (0.107) (0.105) (0.111)
Public expenditure controls     
Socio-demographic controls    
Economic controls   
Geographic controls  
Church controls 
Year FE      
Municipality FE      
Observations 3,696 3,696 3,696 3,696 3,696 3,696
Municipalities 308 308 308 308 308 308
R-squared -0.034 0.607 0.630 0.760 0.772 0.783
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 70.36 70.33 69.83 64.63 68.70 60.33
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at municipality level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. FE
= fixed effects.
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Table 6: Controlling for initial preferences - IV results
Dependent variable: Votes Share of Christian Democrats
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mafia1987 × PCI-DC shares 0.632*** 0.642*** 0.624*** 0.597*** 0.655*** 0.590***
(0.182) (0.184) (0.188) (0.185) (0.185) (0.192)
Public expenditure controls     
Socio-demographic controls    
Economic controls   
Geographic controls  
Church controls 
Before 1960 DC & PCI shares × year dummies      
Year FE      
Municipality FE      
Observations 2,464 2,464 2,464 2,464 2,464 2,464
Municipalities 308 308 308 308 308 308
R-squared R-squared 0.154 0.153 0.175 0.183 0.191 0.211
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 66.19 65.46 64.82 62.42 69.85 60.39
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at municipality level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1. FE = fixed effects.
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Table 7: Exploring the impact of mafia over time
Dependent variable: DC Votes Share Share of construction
workers
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mafia1987× 1960s dummy 0.0174 0.0596* 0.00217 0.0288**
(0.0123) (0.0321) (0.00417) (0.0125)
Mafia1987× 1970s dummy 0.0303** 0.111*** 0.00829 0.0343**
(0.0141) (0.0394) (0.00554) (0.0172)
Mafia1987× 1980s dummy 0.0443*** 0.134*** 0.0105* 0.0253*
(0.0155) (0.0433) (0.00593) (0.0146)
Mafia1987× post-1970 dummy 0.0312*** 0.102*** 0.00863* 0.0203*
(0.0110) (0.0322) (0.00459) (0.0123)
Public expenditure controls        
Socio-demographic controls        
Economic controls        
Geographic controls        
Church controls        
Year FE        
Municipality FE        
Observations 4,440 3,696 4,440 3,696 4,440 3,696 4,440 3,696
Municipalities 370 308 370 308 370 308 370 308
R-squared 0.206 0.212 0.205 0.214 0.771 0.779 0.771 0.784
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 19.12 58.78 19.12 58.78
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at municipality level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. FE = fixed effects.
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Table 8: Alternative identification strategies - IV results
Dependent variable: DC Votes Share Share of construction
workers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mafia1987 × PCI-DC shares 0.811*** 0.952** 0.579** 0.229** 0.201 -0.0197
(0.270) (0.416) (0.226) (0.110) (0.195) (0.102)
Full set of controls      
Year FE      
Municipality FE    
Time-invariant controls × PCI-DC shares  
Mafia and neighbors only    
Neighbor-pair FE  
Observations 3,696 2,112 1,668 3,696 2,112 1,668
Municipalities 308 176 139 308 176 139
R-squared 0.196 0.229 0.597 0.772 0.791 0.821
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 61.59 17.25 6.092 61.59 17.25 6.092
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at municipality level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Full set of
controls includes public expenditure, socio-demographic, economic, geographical, and Church controls as listed in Table 1.
Time-invariant controls includes geographical, and Church controls as listed in Table 1. FE = fixed effects.
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Table 9: Alternative measures of mafia and electoral competition
Dependent variable: DC Votes Share Share of construction DC Votes Share Share of construction
workers workers
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mafia1994 × PCI-DC shares 0.148* 1.015*** 0.0702* 0.290**
(0.0851) (0.340) (0.0358) (0.145)
Mafia1987 × International 0.0208 0.130*** 0.0161** 0.0525***
(0.0168) (0.0453) (0.00632) (0.0180)
Public expenditure controls        
Socio-demographic controls        
Economic controls        
Geographic controls        
Church controls        
Year FE        
Municipality FE        
Observations 4,440 3,696 4,440 3,696 4,440 3,696 4,440 3,696
Municipalities 370 308 370 308 370 308 370 308
R-squared 0.202 0.191 0.771 0.776 0.201 0.223 0.770 0.781
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 31.87 31.87 63.64 63.64
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at municipality level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. FE = fixed effects.
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Table 10: Falsification exercise - the impact of the gap between PRI and MSI votes
Dependent variable: DC Votes Share Share of construction
workers
OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mafia1987 × PRI-MSI shares -0.0769 0.355 0.0739 -0.312
(0.231) (0.591) (0.0769) (0.208)
Public expenditure controls    
Socio-demographic controls    
Economic controls    
Geographic controls    
Church controls    
Year FE    
Municipality FE    
Observations 4,440 3,696 4,440 3,696
Municipalities 370 308 370 308
R-squared 0.201 0.233 0.770 0.783
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 62.26 62.26
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at municipality level in parentheses; ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. MSI = Italian Social Movement, PRI = Italian Re-
publican Party, FE = fixed effects.
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Table 11: Falsification exercise - The impact of mafia on other sectors
Share of labor force employed in:
Dependent variable: Industry Banking Transportation Public workers
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Mafia1987 × PCI-DC shares -0.0988** -0.232* 0.0111 0.0456 0.00478 0.00216 0.00232 0.115** 0.146 0.00294
(0.0471) (0.132) (0.0193) (0.0451) (0.00366) (0.00734) (0.0180) (0.0540) (0.0972) (0.0419)
Public expenditure controls          
Socio-demographic controls          
Economic controls          
Geographic controls          
Church controls          
Year FE          
Municipality FE         
Mafia and neighbors only 
Neighbor-pair FE 
Observations 4,440 3,696 4,440 3,696 4,440 3,696 4,440 3,696 2,112 1,668
Municipalities 370 308 370 308 370 308 370 308 176 139
R-squared 0.453 0.453 0.468 0.477 0.633 0.623 0.726 0.736 0.769 0.859
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 60.33 60.33 60.33 60.33 17.25 6.092
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at municipality level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. FE = fixed effects.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. The share of votes earned by the two parties at equilibrium in region 1 are
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Rearranging the equation in terms of θA
1
:
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Substituting the latter expression in the equilibrium value of m⋆ as defined in equation
(12), we get:
pA⋆ =
6(3− n)
27− 2n (9− 4e)
−
12 (1− n) θA
2
27− 2n (9− 4e)
−
12n∆1
27− 2n (9− 4e)
Since the number of votes shifted by the mafia is epA⋆,
∂epA⋆
∂∆1
= −
12en
27− 2n (9− 4e)
< 0
which completes the proof.
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Table A1: The impact of DC electoral outcome on construction activities
Dependent variable: Share of construction workers over labor force
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DC share 0.00240 0.00162 -0.0178 -0.0119 -0.0116 -0.0107
(0.0142) (0.0140) (0.0116) (0.00921) (0.00936) (0.00931)
Public expenditure controls     
Socio-demographic controls    
Economic controls   
Geographic controls  
Church controls 
Year FE      
Municipality FE      
Observations 4,440 4,440 4,440 4,440 4,440 4,440
Municipalities 370 370 370 370 370 370
R-squared 0.568 0.568 0.645 0.755 0.764 0.770
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at municipality level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. FE
= fixed effects.
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Table A2: First stage results
Dependent variable: Mafia1987 × PCI-DC shares
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mafia1900 × PCI-DC shares 0.161*** 0.160*** 0.159*** 0.157*** 0.160*** 0.152***
(0.0192) (0.0191) (0.0190) (0.0195) (0.0192) (0.0196)
Public expenditure controls     
Socio-demographic controls    
Economic controls   
Geographic controls  
Church controls 
Year FE      
Municipality FE      
Observations 3,696 3,696 3,696 3,696 3,696 3,696
Municipalities 308 308 308 308 308 308
R-squared 0.182 0.388 0.399 0.404 0.462 0.467
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at municipality level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. FE
= fixed effects.
5
5
Table A3: The origin of extra votes
Dependent variable: Votes Share Left Votes Share Right Turnout
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mafia1987 × PCI-DC shares -0.124 -0.528** -0.0229 -0.0535 -0.0338 -0.117
(0.0931) (0.225) (0.0723) (0.180) (0.0650) (0.167)
Public expenditure controls      
Socio-demographic controls      
Economic controls      
Geographic controls      
Church controls      
Year FE      
Municipality FE      
Observations 4,440 3,696 4,440 3,696 4,440 3,696
Municipalities 370 308 370 308 370 308
R-squared 0.477 0.466 0.328 0.337 0.672 0.710
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 60.33 60.33 60.33
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at municipality level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1. FE = fixed effects.
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Table A4: The impact of mafia on DC electoral outcome - IV including sulfur production
Dependent variable: Votes Share of Christian Democrats
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mafia1987 × PCI-DC shares 0.452* 0.479** 0.510** 0.544** 0.659*** 0.805***
(0.242) (0.238) (0.239) (0.244) (0.248) (0.269)
Public expenditure controls     
Socio-demographic controls    
Economic controls   
Geographic controls  
Church controls 
Year FE      
Municipality FE      
Observations 3,696 3,696 3,696 3,696 3,696 3,696
Municipalities 308 308 308 308 308 308
R-squared -0.008 0.183 0.200 0.201 0.212 0.219
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 35.24 35.21 35.13 32.74 35.19 30.97
P-value Hansen test 0.610 0.836 0.928 0.983 0.437 0.509
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at municipality level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. FE
= fixed effects. Excluded instruments: mafia 1900×PCI-DC shares and sulfur production 1980s×PCI-DC shares.
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Table A5: The impact of mafia on construction activities - IV including with sulfur production
Dependent variable: Share of construction workers over labor force
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mafia1987 × PCI-DC shares 0.265** 0.269** 0.303** 0.285*** 0.285*** 0.231**
(0.129) (0.129) (0.124) (0.106) (0.104) (0.111)
Public expenditure controls     
Socio-demographic controls    
Economic controls   
Geographic controls  
Church controls 
Year FE      
Municipality FE      
Observations 3,696 3,696 3,696 3,696 3,696 3,696
Municipalities 308 308 308 308 308 308
R-squared -0.025 0.610 0.634 0.761 0.773 0.783
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 35.24 35.21 35.13 32.74 35.19 30.97
P-value Hansen test 0.478 0.500 0.294 0.874 0.996 0.890
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at municipality level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. FE
= fixed effects. Excluded instruments: mafia 1900×PCI-DC shares and sulfur production 1980s×PCI-DC shares.
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Table A6: The impact of mafia on DC Senate electoral outcome - OLS results
Dependent variable: Votes Share of Christian Democrats
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mafia1987 × PCI-DC shares 0.0233 0.0442 0.1000 0.107 0.119 0.115
(0.0815) (0.0800) (0.0814) (0.0793) (0.0848) (0.0858)
Public expenditure controls     
Socio-demographic controls    
Economic controls   
Geographic controls  
Church controls 
Year FE      
Municipality FE      
Observations 4,070 4,070 4,070 4,070 4,070 4,070
Municipalities 370 370 370 370 370 370
R-squared 0.144 0.152 0.189 0.193 0.211 0.219
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at municipality level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1. FE = fixed effects.
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Table A7: The impact of mafia on DC Senate electoral outcome - IV results
Dependent variable: Votes Share of Christian Democrats
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mafia1987 × PCI-DC shares -0.165 -0.157 -0.00852 0.0782 0.208 0.304
(0.214) (0.212) (0.208) (0.212) (0.214) (0.230)
Public expenditure controls     
Socio-demographic controls    
Economic controls   
Geographic controls  
Church controls 
Year FE      
Municipality FE      
Observations 3,388 3,388 3,388 3,388 3,388 3,388
Municipalities 308 308 308 308 308 308
R-squared -0.003 0.164 0.188 0.196 0.211 0.221
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 70.37 70.49 69.93 64.80 68.57 60.18
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at municipality level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1. FE = fixed effects.
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